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PLATFORM PLEADING: ANALYZING EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES IN THE TECHNOLOGY SECTOR
Joseph A. Seiner*
Abstract: The technology sector has created thousands of new jobs for workers across the
country in an emerging multi-billion dollar industry. Many companies in this platform-based
sector are attempting to characterize their workers as independent contractors rather than
employees, thus stripping them of both federal and state workplace protections—including the
right to bargain collectively, receive fair compensation, and avoid discrimination. The federal
courts, which have always grappled with the question of worker classification, are now
struggling to define employment with respect to these gig sector jobs. The result has been
scattered court decisions with inconsistent and conflicting analyses.
This Essay seeks to provide the courts with much needed guidance on the question of
worker classification in the technology sector at the pleading stage of a case. This Essay
performs a review of the recent cases that have addressed this issue, synthesizing the varied
analyses of these decisions. Navigating the reasoning used by the courts, as well as the
Supreme Court’s evolving pleading precedent, this Essay proposes a new analytical framework
for addressing the question of worker classification for technology sector claims. The model
proposed by this Essay will assist the courts and litigants in better evaluating whether an
employment relationship has been established by a platform-based worker in the gig economy.
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Better never means better for everyone . . . . It always means
worse, for some.1
—The Commander, The Handmaid’s Tale
INTRODUCTION
The rise of the so-called gig economy in the technology sector has
created an expansive new industry that has generated billions of dollars
and thousands of new employment opportunities. The sector has been
described as offering “dream” jobs, providing workers the opportunity for
“setting their own hours, working from home, [and] being their own
bosses.”2 The sector has seen tremendous growth, as over 15% of the
workforce now finds their employment tied to the technology sector.3 The
gig economy has generated enormous excitement, numerous jobs and
1. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE 211 (First Anchor Books 1998) (1986).
2. Andy Sullivan, Here’s How to Prepare for Your Financial Future if You Work in the Gig
Economy, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 28, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/gig-economy-how-toachieve-financial-wellness-2017-10 [https://perma.cc/33G9-2QJA].
3. Id.; see also Ben Casselman, Maybe the Gig Economy Isn’t Reshaping Work After All, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
7,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/07/business/economy/
work-gig-economy.html [https://perma.cc/W22C-JC2V].
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substantial prosperity. While this new sector has created vast new
opportunities for employment, these jobs—when compared with more
traditional work—have not been “better for everyone” and have indeed
been undeniably “worse, for some.”4
The primary hurdle facing many of these workers has been the loss of
their employment status. Many gig sector companies have attempted to
characterize their workers as independent contractors rather than
employees, thus depriving them of most state and federal employment
protections.5 Efforts to characterize workers in this way are not surprising,
as recent estimates show that companies spend far less on workers who
lack true employment status.6
Independent contractors lack the protections afforded most employees
under federal and state law including wage, hour, and overtime
provisions, and anti-discrimination protections.7 But despite the
significance of a worker’s classification, the courts have struggled for
decades to clearly define employment status.8 The gig economy has only
added an additional layer of complexity to this issue. Employment laws
in this country were written at a time that pre-dated not only platformbased workers, but the internet as well.9 The courts have thus struggled to
apply these laws to the more modern workers found in the gig economy.10

4. ATWOOD, supra note 1, at 211.
5. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (addressing
the question of worker employment status).
6. See Noam Scheiber, Gig Economy Business Model Dealt a Blow in California Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/business/economy/gig-economyruling.html [https://perma.cc/UTQ3-HF9Y] (“[C]lassifying drivers and other gig workers as
employees tends to cost 20 to 30 percent more than classifying them as contractors.”).
7. See Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) provisions only protect employees); Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466
F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2006) (addressing employment status and FLSA issues); Lerohl v. Friends of
Minn. Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining that both Title VII and the ADA protect
employees but not independent contractors); Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1091–
92 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Of primary significance, Grubhub did not control the manner or means of [the
plaintiff’s] work, including whether he worked at all or for how long or how often, or even whether
he performed deliveries for Grubhub’s competitors at the same time he had agreed to deliver for
Grubhub.”); Sill v. AVSX Techs., LLC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 664, 670 (D.S.C. 2017) (“Only an employee
may recover under the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act and FLSA.”).
8. See infra Part IV (discussing tests for determining existence of employment relationship); see
generally Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How
It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 340 (2001) (“For modern employment
law purposes, control is an indistinct cloud that may or may not cross a vague line set arbitrarily by a
judge or agency as the boundary of employee status.”).
9. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 340; infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part IV (discussing the application of the plausibility standard to technology sector
workers).

17 - Seiner.docx (Do Not Delete)

1950

12/20/2019 10:55 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1947

The uncertainty in this area has resulted in widespread litigation by
platform-based workers claiming employment law violations.11 This
multi-billion-dollar industry has already seen numerous individual and
class-action employment claims brought on the basis of different
workplace laws, including wage, hour and overtime violations.12
The courts have struggled to properly analyze many of these claims.13
While analyzing these workplace claims is difficult enough, the Supreme
Court added an additional layer of complexity with the plausibility
pleading standard created in its decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly14 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.15 These cases overturned decades of
pleading precedent by adopting a new requirement that plaintiffs must
allege enough facts in the complaint to set forth a plausible claim.16 This
new plausibility standard has generated substantial confusion over which
specific facts are necessary to include in a complaint, particularly for those
cases brought in the employment context.17 The plausibility standard has had
a negative impact on plaintiffs in the civil rights and workplace fields, and
employment litigants have struggled to satisfy this test in the lower courts.18
The combination of the new gig sector worker with the overall
difficulty of applying both employment laws generally and the Supreme
Court pleading standard have left many lower courts confused. As one
federal court judge eloquently stated, resolving the question of who is an
employee in the platform economy is like being “handed a square peg and
asked to choose between two round holes.”19 The result of this confused
area of the law has been varied reasoning in scattered opinions, and the
11. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, Tailoring Class Actions to the On-Demand Economy, 78 OHIO
ST. L.J. 21 (2017) [hereinafter Seiner, Tailoring Class Actions] (discussing numerous cases advancing
litigation on employment-related issues in the technology sector).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007).
15. 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).
16. Id.; Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556–57 (2007).
17. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179 (2010) [hereinafter
Seiner, After Iqbal].
18. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing Iqbal’s impact on civil cases); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil
Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) (considering changes
which have made it more difficult for discrimination claimants to bring claims); see generally Joseph
A. Seiner, Plausibility & Disparate Impact, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (2012) [hereinafter Seiner,
Plausibility & Disparate Impact]; A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive
Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment
Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010).
19. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

17 - Seiner.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

12/20/2019 10:55 AM

PLATFORM PLEADING

1951

courts have faced tremendous difficulty in developing a consistent body
of case law. The courts (and litigants) are simply unsure what it takes to
sufficiently plead a workplace violation in the platform economy.20
This Essay takes some of the guesswork out of litigation in the
technology sector. This Essay performs a review of many of the recent
published federal court decisions on the question of employment status in
the technology sector. More specifically, this Essay examines how the
courts have addressed motions to dismiss brought by platform sector
employers on this question. This issue has not been fully addressed by the
federal appellate courts—at least not in the technology sector—and thus
the review performed here looks primarily to federal district court
decisions. This function of the Essay is both descriptive and normative,
and this Essay closely details the analysis used by the courts when
evaluating—at the pleading stage of the case—the existence of an
employment relationship in the technology sector.21
Simply reporting the results of how the federal courts have ruled on
which technology sector workers are considered employees does provide
worthwhile information in this emerging field. Beyond performing this
reporting mechanism, however, this Essay takes the next broad step. It
synthesizes these decisions, concluding that the federal courts have
largely treated cases involving platform-based workers in one
of three ways.22
First, some courts have concluded that the worker in the case has failed
to allege sufficient facts in the complaint to establish an employment
relationship with the technology sector employer. These courts have
tended to apply a more heightened, rigid version of the Supreme Court’s
plausibility standard to the claim in the case.23 Second, a number of courts
have taken a contrary approach and concluded that the facts presented by
the plaintiff in the complaint are sufficient to create at least a factual
question on the issue of employment, and the courts have therefore
allowed the case to proceed to discovery. These courts have been more
flexible in their approach to pleading and view the question of
employment status as one that is more appropriate for resolution at a later
stage of the litigation.24 Finally, some courts have avoided the question

20. See infra sections IV.A–IV.C (discussing different approaches of federal courts to technology
sector workplace claims).
21. See infra Part IV (summarizing federal district court decisions).
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra section IV.A (addressing rigid application of plausibility standard).
24. See infra section IV.B (discussing more flexible approach by courts to applying
plausibility test).
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altogether. These courts have either sidestepped resolving the
employment question or have decided the matter on other grounds.25
What is remarkable about a close examination of these cases is that the
vast majority of them arise in one particular subset of the technology
sector—ridesharing, platform-based companies.26 Given the widespread
press coverage and publicity the litigation in this area has received, it is
not surprising to find many published decisions in this field.27 Many of
these include a similar set of facts with respect to the workers and
employers involved. Despite sharing these common facts, the courts have
been unable to agree on the correct way to approach these claims. Rather,
they have analyzed the cases in one of the three very different ways
outlined above.28 This uncertainty will only create further litigation in this
area, as there is no common set of ground rules as to how these cases
should be addressed.
This Essay attempts to establish these ground rules. Indeed, this Essay
sets forth a proposed pleading standard for gig sector workers to
sufficiently establish the existence of an employment relationship in the
case. With the technology sector specifically in mind, this Essay suggests
a model framework that the courts can use to properly analyze any claim
in this area.29 Looking to the federal court decisions already existing in
the field as well as the Supreme Court’s plausibility pleading standard, the
framework proposed here establishes a six-part test that can be used to
determine whether sufficient facts have been alleged by a technology
sector worker to create this employment relationship. This test focuses
heavily on the element of control which has been required by the courts
and is found in the common law.30 However, by integrating the flexibility
inherent of most work in the technology sector, the proposed model
considers this control requirement from the standpoint of this new and still
emerging economy.
The model proposed by this Essay has a number of important
implications.31 The confusion and uncertainty found in this field has
25. See infra section IV.C (discussing how some federal courts have avoided employment
questions raised in technology-sector cases).
26. See generally Part IV (summarizing technology sector cases).
27. See generally Casselman, supra note 3; Faiz Siddiqui, New York Considering Setting Minimum
Wage for Uber, Lyft Drivers, WASH. POST (July 2, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2018/07/02/new-york-considering-setting-minimumwage-for-uber-lyft-drivers/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2019, 5:22 PM).
28. See id.
29. See infra Part V (preparing model framework to consider workplace disputes arising in
technology sector cases).
30. See infra Part V.
31. See infra Part VI (discussing implications of analytical framework suggested in this Essay).
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caused widespread frustration on the question of employment in the
technology sector.32 While no test can capture all factual possibilities of
gig sector employment, the model proposed here can be used by the
majority of courts as a general framework to evaluate a platform sector
case. Similarly, both defendants and plaintiffs will have much clearer
guidance on what should be alleged in the technology sector with respect
to the employment relationship.33 By creating more certainty in this area,
the complaints will be more precise and the claims themselves will be
more clearly framed. Indeed, where there is more certainty in the law,
there is a greater likelihood of settlement and reduced overall litigation.34
This type of judicial efficiency is sorely needed in the technology sector,
which has faced a tremendous amount of overall litigation.35
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Part II, this Essay navigates the
history of pleading laws in this country. The Essay explains the
development of the pleading rules over time and explores the role of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Part details the importance of the
notice pleading standard created by these rules. Part III of this Essay
further explores the development of the Supreme Court’s plausibility
standard. This Part explains how this new test overturned decades of
pleading precedent and created substantial confusion in the lower courts.
Part IV of this Essay reviews the current case law in this area. This Part
synthesizes these decisions, explaining the three different approaches the
federal district courts have taken on the question of employment in the
technology sector. Some courts have applied a heightened pleading
standard, some courts have taken a much more relaxed approach, and
others have simply avoided the question altogether. Part V of this Essay
proposes a model pleading standard for evaluating whether an
employment relationship has been properly alleged in a complaint brought
by a workplace plaintiff in the technology sector. The test proposed here
navigates the difficult question of defining employment, the intricacies of
32. See Jeffrey Hirsch & Joseph Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1727, 1729 (2017) (“Workers in the on-demand technology sector represent a new breed of
employees, and courts are still struggling to define this hybrid working relationship. While the law
grapples with the rights that should be afforded to these workers, many employee protections are
simply falling through the cracks.”).
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment:
Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 136 (2006) [hereinafter Seiner,
Disentangling Disparate Impact] (“[A]ll parties should benefit in the long term [from less confusion]
as greater certainty in the legal process leads to reduced litigation costs.” (citing Richard B. Stewart,
The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 655, 662 (1985))).
35. Indeed, greater certainty in the law can even reduce potential barriers for technology sector
start-ups. The current confusion created by state and federal employment laws can create serious
hurdles for potential businesses attempting to enter the technology industry.
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the platform-based workplace, and the Supreme Court’s plausibility
pleading standard. Part VI discusses the implications of the analytical
framework proposed in this Essay. This Part notes some of the efficiencies
that the proposed framework would create, as well as the greater certainty
that would be provided in a currently confused area of the law. This Part
further addresses some of the possible concerns that could be raised by
adopting the model proposed here.
One thing is certain in defining technology sector employment: there is
no such definition. This Essay provides much-needed guidance in this
emerging area of the law.
I.

THE HISTORY OF PLEADING AND THE COMPLAINT

While legal scholars typically view the federal rules in modern terms
through the lens of modern cases, it can be instructive to take a step back
and examine the pleading standards from a historical perspective. These
rules have evolved over hundreds of years, and an understanding of the
changes that have occurred over time is helpful when considering the
proper tests that should be used.36
While this Essay is not a historical piece, and thus cannot fully explore
the fascinating and in-depth history of pleading rules in this country, both
cultural and political developments played important roles in the creation
of the rules that we have today. The procedural rules that we currently
have in this country are borrowed heavily from English law.37 The English
system contained inconsistencies in its rules between the courts of equity
and courts of law.38 The system in England was complex and heavily
favored the more sophisticated pleader, rather than the individual with the
more meritorious claim.39
In the United States, the pleading standards were quite different in the
early courts of the colonies.40 To provide more clarity and consistency,
36. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of
Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1111 (2010); see generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Discrimination Presumption, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1115 (2019) [hereinafter Seiner, Discrimination Presumption] (discussing
pleading rules in context of workplace cases).
37. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1116; see generally Seiner, Discrimination
Presumption, supra note 36.
38. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (3d ed. 2005); Jack Ritchie,
Flexible Interpretation of Rules of Court to Suit Circumstances of a Particular Case, 24 TEX. L. REV.
77 (1945); Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 518, 520 (1957).
39. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 38; Ritchie, supra note 38; Weinstein & Distler, supra
note 38.
40. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 97.
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the state legislatures started adopting a code pleading system in the early
1800s.41 Despite being designed as an attempt to streamline the pleading
system, code pleading ultimately resulted in a “slow, expensive, and
unworkable” process that required parties to be heavily inclusive in
their pleading.42
The Field Code, adopted by New York in 1848 (and subsequently by
numerous other states) did away with the distinction between law and
equity.43 The result was to allow a simple type of suit, the civil action.44
The Field Code also sought to be simpler than other systems, and to
provide greater access to the courts.45 Nonetheless, over time, a strict
application of the rules of the Field Code led to its downfall.46
Numerous changes were made to both state and federal pleading rules
during the subsequent decades.47 Congress sought to unify the pleading
rules in the 1930s, and an Advisory Committee of practitioners and law
professors (including Professor Charles E. Clark) worked through
multiple early drafts of a uniform procedural system.48 The final version
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were put in place on September
16, 1938.49 The rules rejected an overly fact-intensive pleading system,
which could allow more sophisticated parties to prevail rather than those
with the more meritorious claims.50 Perhaps the centerpiece of this
approach was Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires
only that a plaintiff give “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
41. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1114.
42. Id. (quoting 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004)).
43. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 293; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1115.
44. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 293.
45. Id. at 293–94, 1116 (quoting 1848 N.Y. Laws 521); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1115.
46. Weinstein & Distler, supra note 38, at 520.
47. Id. at 518–21; Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 353–54 (1987); see also
Charles E. Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 1303, 1320 (1936); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1117; Stephen N. Subrin, Federal
Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns,
137 U. PENN. L. REV. 1999, 2002 (1989).
48. Goodman, supra note 47, at 353–58; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1117; Michael E.
Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 916
(1976); cf. Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit
Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989) (“[T]he few
existing procedure histories suffer from too much reliance on the work of Charles Clark, one of the
most influential early twentieth century reformers and an historian of code procedure. Clark’s reform
ambitions skewed his historical work.”).
49. Goodman, supra note 47, at 363–64; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1117.
50. Edward D. Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 105 (2011).
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that the pleader is entitled to relief.”51 These rules provided for a "notice
pleading" system, whereby providing the opponent with simple notice of
the claim was sufficient to allow the plaintiff to proceed in the case.52 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus finally provided a robust, uniform
procedural system that favored parties proceeding to discovery in cases
where the merits of individual claims could be better assessed.53
Of course, this system was far from perfect and much criticism
emerged with respect to this approach.54 In particular, defendants were
often frustrated that the system seemed to favor plaintiffs, and that they
were often forced to incur great expenses simply to evaluate the merit of
a claim.55
Despite the criticism, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure formed the
basis of pleading claims in the federal system, which allowed for liberal
discovery.56 In the decades following the adoption of these rules, the
Supreme Court has interpreted and refined their meaning through
numerous decisions.57 Perhaps the most well-known Supreme Court
pleading decision came in Conley v. Gibson,58 an opinion issued in 1957.59
In Conley, a group of black railway workers brought a class action
against their union (and others) for failing to represent them on the basis
of their race.60 In examining the pleadings, the Supreme Court concluded,
in a now well-known statement, that “a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.”61 The Court noted that the pleading requirements are designed
to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
52. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 257 (5th ed. 1999); GENE R. SHREVE &
PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 229 (4th ed. 2009); Cavanagh, supra
note 50, at 106; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1118; Weinstein & Distler, supra note 38, at
522.
53. Cavanagh, supra note 50, at 106; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1118; Smith, supra note
48, at 918; Weinstein & Distler, supra note 38, at 523 (“[A] resulting general requirement that
pleadings be sufficiently detailed to give the parties and court notice of the particular transactions
relied upon and of the rule of law being invoked.”).
54. Cavanagh, supra note 50, at 107.
55. See id.
56. Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment
and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 235–38 (2011).
57. Id.
58. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
59. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1120.
60. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42.
61. Id. at 45–46.
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grounds upon which it rests,” and “to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits,” rather than favoring a particular party based on skillful
pleading.62 The holding in Conley established the basis for the relaxed
pleading standard for the next five decades. The decision largely stood for
the proposition that liberal pleading standards and discovery
should govern.
The Supreme Court has applied the Conley standard to varying contexts
since. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,63 the Supreme Court provided its
most recent guidance on the appropriate pleading standards for federal
employment discrimination cases.64 In 2002, Swierkiewicz, a Hungarian
immigrant, alleged that he had been demoted because of his age and
national origin.65 While the lower courts rejected the complaint on the
pleadings, the Supreme Court noted that plaintiffs should not be subjected
to a heightened pleading standard and “need not plead a prima facie case
of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss.”66 Establishing a prima
facie case is not necessary under the pleading requirements as it creates
an unnecessary burden on plaintiffs prior to discovery and because of the
unique requirements found in employment discrimination claims.67 Thus,
in a complaint, a discrimination plaintiff need not allege all of the prima
facie requirements: “[that he belongs to] a protected class, that [he was]
qualified for the position, that [he] suffered an adverse employment
action, and that there is other evidence giving rise to an inference of
discrimination.”68
The Supreme Court precedent from Conley appeared to settle the
pleading standards for civil cases—establishing a relatively low bar and
liberal discovery rules. The Court’s decision in Swierkiewiez seemed to
follow this trend, similarly creating a low pleading bar for employment
discrimination plaintiffs. Decades of well-established pleading precedent
would all change with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and the introduction of a plausibility
requirement.69
62. Id. at 47–48.
63. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
64. Id. at 508–09.
65. Id.
66. Seiner, After Iqbal, supra note 17, at 184–85 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510–11).
67. Id. (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510–11).
68. Id. at 185.
69. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 444 (2007). Cf.
Charles Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613,
1621 (2011) (“The ultimate interplay between Twombly/Iqbal and Swierkiewicz remains to be finally
resolved in the courts, or, perhaps, in Congress . . . .”).
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THE RISE OF THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD

In Twombly, the Supreme Court revisited years of settled pleading
precedent. Twombly involved a complex antitrust case brought pursuant
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act.70 The plaintiffs alleged that certain
telephone companies were engaging in inappropriate conduct that
disfavored competition and that they had not properly competed outside
of their markets.71 In considering the case, the Supreme Court abrogated
Conley and the “no set of facts” standard, replacing it with a plausibility
requirement.72 This new test “requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.”73 More specifically, a complaint must include “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and must “raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.”74 While the Court stated that a
plausible claim does “not require heightened fact pleading of specifics,”
the standard has dramatically changed the pleading requirements with this
new test.75 And this vague plausibility standard has left judges with
substantial discretion when considering the sufficiency of the pleadings.76
Two years later, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court further refined the
plausibility requirement, making clear that the new test would apply
beyond the antitrust context. After the tragic events of September 11,
2001, Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani citizen, was detained as part of the
subsequent investigations.77 After his detainment and conviction, Iqbal
filed a claim against former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI
Director Robert Mueller.78 Iqbal’s complaint alleged that his detainment
was the result of an “unconstitutional policy that subjected [him] to harsh
conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national
origin.”79 He further alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller both knew of and
inappropriately agreed to subject him to those illegal conditions.80
Applying the new pleading standard from Twombly, the Court
concluded that Iqbal’s allegations had “not ‘nudged [his] claims’ of
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
Id. at 550–51.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Brescia, supra note 56, at 238.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 669.
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invidious discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to
plausible.’”81 The Court found that the plaintiff's lack of facts and overly
conclusory allegations “disentitle[d] [the allegations] to the presumption
of truth.”82 In addition, the Court held that it was more likely that the facts
supported nondiscriminatory, anti-terrorism activity rather than targeted,
unlawful conduct.83 After ruling on the insufficiency of Iqbal’s complaint,
the Court further rejected his legal arguments.84 First, the Court declined
to limit the plausibility standard from Twombly to antitrust claims, and
instead expressly held that the new test should apply to all civil actions.85
Second, the Court refused to “relax the pleading requirements on the
ground that the Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive
discovery.”86 Finally, the Court rejected the claim that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure should allow for discriminatory intent to be alleged
generally—sufficient factual support is required.87 Following Twombly
and Iqbal, lower courts and plaintiffs would struggle with determining the
facts necessary to plead a plausible civil claim.
In the years following these decisions, the plausibility standard has
seemed to favor defendants.88 While the standard may have provided
some overall benefit in reducing legal costs and streamlining cases, it has
also established a formidable barrier with respect to access to the courts
and legal justice.89
At a minimum, the plausibility standard has generated substantial
confusion in the lower courts. And, some courts have applied the
plausibility test in a way that has heightened the pleading requirements for
plaintiffs,90 though there is certainly debate on this question91 and empirical
81. Id. at 680 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007).
82. Id. at 681.
83. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still Out for Civil Rights and
Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 723 (2012).
84. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 686.
87. Id. at 686–87.
88. See Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES (July 20,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21bar.html [https://perma.cc/2WVU-X3DT].
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 2013) (referring to
“unresolved tension” in pleading cases); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To the
extent that we perceive a difference in the application of Rule 8(a) in the two groups of cases, it is
difficult to know in cases that come before us whether we should apply the more lenient or the more
demanding standard.”); Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010)
(discussing impact of Iqbal decision on circuit case law); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,
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studies are far from conclusive.92 Nonetheless, some studies suggest that there
has been an overall negative impact for civil rights plaintiffs.93
The creation and development of the plausibility standard also
coincides with the expanding platform economy94 over the past several
years.95 As discussed in greater detail below, the courts have had difficulty
applying this standard,96 and, more specifically, defining “employment”
with respect to technology workers.97

403 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that courts are “still struggling” with application of plausibility
standard).
92. See generally William H.J. Hubbard, The Empirical Effects of Twombly and Iqbal (CoaseSandor
Inst.
for
Law
&
Econ.,
Working
Paper
No.
773,
2016),
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2479&context=law_and_economi
cs [https://perma.cc/6588-DCJ2] (summarizing studies).
93. Malveaux, supra note 83, at 719, 728–31; see also Brescia, supra note 56 (discussing housing
cases); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010)
(discussing impact of Twombly and Iqbal); Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles
in the Quest for Justice, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 623–31 (2011) (discussing procedural changes
and impact on civil rights plaintiffs); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How
Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010) (discussing Twombly and Iqbal and effect on civil rights plaintiffs).
94. See generally Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work
Arrangements in the United States, 1995–2015 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 22667, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22667.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV9L-Z5BY] (noting
that percentage of workers with alternative work arrangements “rose from 10.7 percent in February
2005 to 15.8 percent in late 2015”); cf. Diana Farrell & Fiona Greig, The Online Platform Economy:
Has Growth Peaked?, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST. (Nov. 2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.co
m/corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-online-platform-econ-brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/57CJ-T8NZ].
95. See generally Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1635 (2017); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 87, 94 (2016).
96. See Colleen McNamara, Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test: An Empirical Study of District Court
Interpretations of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 401, 424–25 (2011) (“At this early stage, it
appears that Iqbal has only generated more confusion over pleading standards because it proposed a
test that has been cited by less than half the circuits and has been rigorously applied by an even smaller
fraction.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1299, 1311–13 (2010)
(discussing problems with the plausibility standard); see generally Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614
F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010); Lonny Hoffman, Plausible Theory, Implausible Conclusions, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 143, 143 (2016) (“[T]rial courts struggle to consistently apply these unfamiliar
steps at the pleading stage.”).
97. See generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1311 (2017); Brishen Rogers,
Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
479, 482 (2016); E. Gary Spitko, A Structural-Purposive Interpretation of “Employment” in the
Platform Economy, 70 FLA. L. REV. 409, 427 (2018).
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III. PLEADING AND THE PLATFORM ECONOMY
Courts across the country have recently addressed the difficulty of
applying the plausibility standard to technology-sector cases. The
standard itself is in flux, as it is still in its early stages and being more
fully discussed in the courts and academic literature.98 Applying this
developing standard to a developing economy thus presents unique
challenges.99 Indeed, the facts necessary to “sufficiently allege
employment”100 for technology workers are unclear at best. And, as gig
sector cases are now brought in courts across the country, jurisdictional
differences are beginning to appear.
In the workplace context, the contours of the employment relationship
are perhaps the most critical issue currently being developed in the lower
courts.101 Regardless of how the courts have approached this question,
there is always a focus on the issue of control.102 To be considered an
“employee” by the courts, employers must exert a sufficient amount of
control over the worker.103 The resolution of the question of a worker’s
98. See infra sections IV.A–IV.C (discussing cases in this area).
99. See David Weil, Lots of Employees Get Misclassified as Contractors. Here’s Why It Matters,
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 5, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/07/lots-of-employees-get-misclassified-ascontractors-heres-why-it-matters [https://perma.cc/6CBK-3VU7]; see generally Brookhaven Baptist
Church v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Halvorson), 912 A.2d 770, 777 (Pa. 2006) (noting that
“[c]ourts have struggled to define employment that is ‘casual in character’”); Dan Eaton, Gig
Economy Creates Legal Puzzles for the Courts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2017),
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/technology/sd-fi-labor-eaton-column-20170807story.html# [https://perma.cc/3KTH-VE4B] (“In place of uniform definitions, courts and regulators
have adopted multi-part tests to distinguish” workers in the gig sector).
100. Dejesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2013).
101. See Sill v. AVSX Techs., LLC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 664, 670 (D.S.C. 2017) (“Under South
Carolina law, the question is whether the employer has the right to control the individual in the
performance of work and the manner in which it is done.”); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F.
Supp. 3d 1133, 1148–49 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[T]he ‘principal test of an employment relationship is
whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of
accomplishing the result desired.’” (quoting Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th
522, 531 (2014))).
102. See O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149 (analyzing the “principal” element under Borello, for
instance, “whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and
means of accomplishing the result desired”).
103. See Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Control is only
significant when it shows an individual exerts such a control over a meaningful part of the business
that she stands as a separate economic entity.”); Roslov v. DirecTV Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 965, 974
(E.D. Ark. 2016) (discussing worker status and control over profits); Thornton v. Mainline
Commc’ns, LLC, 157 F. Supp. 3d 844, 849 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (“[Employers] exercised a high degree
of control over the manner in which plaintiffs performed their installation and repair work.”); ;
Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 42 (Cal. 2018) (finding that employees were
improperly misclassified as independent contractors); O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1152 (“[H]irees
who were ‘not required to work either at all or on any particular schedule’ were nonetheless held to
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employment status is a threshold issue, and a worker who is not
considered an employee will be protected by few, if any, of the state or
federal employment laws.104 Where enough facts are alleged to suggest an
employment relationship exists, however, the case will typically be
permitted to proceed, absent any other potential shortcomings.105
The question of employment status is unquestionably specific to
individual jurisdictions and factual scenarios.106 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has provided some overarching guidance on how to
approach this issue, emphasizing the element of control. In the seminal
case, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,107 the Court outlined
the elements to be considered for control, noting that the lower courts
should apply common law agency principles as part of the analysis.108
The Darden Court listed twelve discrete common law agency factors.
As noted by the Darden Court, these agency factors include:
the skill required [for the job]; the source of the instrumentalities
and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship

be employees as a matter of law based on the amount of control the employer could exercise when
those employees decided to turn up for work.” (quoting JKH Enters. Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations,
142 Cal. App. 4th 1046, 1051 (2013))).
104. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., 161 F.3d 299, 303–04 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“Express had minimal control over its drivers”; the drivers’ “profit or loss [was] determined largely
on his or her skill, initiative, ability to cut costs, and understanding of the courier business.”); Razak
v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *54 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (dismissing the
case given “‘that no single factor in the economic reality test is dispositive,’ Plaintiffs have not
brought to the record sufficient proof to meet their burden of showing that they are employees” (citing
Chao v. Mid-Atlantic Installation Servs., 16 F. App’x 104, 106 (4th Cir. 2001))); Hirsch & Seiner,
supra note 32, at 1740 (“[I]ndependent contractors neither have a right to collective action or
bargaining nor any protection against, among other things, discrimination and pay that would violate
the minimum wage or overtime rules.”).
105. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 983–85 (9th Cir. 2014)
(finding employment relationship where employer controlled work hours and specifics of job
performance); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (setting forth jury
question on issue of whether workers are employees or independent contractors); O’Connor, 82 F.
Supp. 3d at 1138 (“[O]nce a plaintiff comes forward with evidence that he provided services for an
employer, the employee has established a prima facie case that the relationship was one of
employer/employee . . . . If the putative employee establishes a prima facie case (i.e., shows they
provided services to the putative employer), the burden then shifts to the employer to prove, if it can,
that the ‘presumed employee was an independent contractor.’” (quoting Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616
F.3d 895, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2010))).
106. See, e.g., Alexander, 765 F.3d at 988–89 (examining question of employment relationship
under California law).
107. 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (“‘In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means
by which the product is accomplished.’” (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 751 (1989))).
108. Id.
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between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired
party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method
of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.109
These control factors set out in Darden have been applied in varying
ways by the lower courts—dependent upon the facts of the case and the
jurisdiction where the claim is brought.110 Moreover, the Darden test was
developed at a time when brick-and-mortar companies were far more
common than they are today.111 The technology sector has forced
employers and the courts to reconceptualize what the employment
relationship means, and non-traditional type relationships are now far
more common.112
The question of who is an employee in the technology sector is
relatively new to the academic literature, and there has been little research
synthesizing the law on this question.113 Indeed, only in recent years have
we begun to see the cases emerge on this question in the federal courts
and the analysis has largely been at the district court level.114 This Essay
surveys much of this law, bringing together the many federal district court
decisions on this question. This Essay thus examines how the courts have
ruled at the pleading stage of a case on the question of who an employee
in the technology sector is. This Essay synthesizes those decisions,

109. Id. at 323–24 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989)).

110. Cf. Carlson, supra note 8, at 338–39 (“Employer control over the details of the work has been
the factor most courts place at the heart of any test of worker status . . . . Indeed, one could argue that
nearly all the other factors listed by courts are merely different ways of evidencing the employer’s
means of control.”).
111. Id.
112. See Abha Bhattarai, Now Hiring, for a One-Day Job: The Gig Economy Hits Retail, WASH.
POST (May 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/now-hiring-for-a-oneday-job-the-gig-economy-hits-retail/2018/05/04/2bebdd3c-4257-11e8-ad8f27a8c409298b_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e653cb6902c1 [https://perma.cc/Q5JXTN6C] (“The rise in gig work comes as state legislatures across the country are considering bills that
would legally classify gig workers as independent contractors, stripping them of a number of
workplace rights and protections. Until now, the distinction between on-demand employee and
contractor has been largely unclear, as evidenced by a number of lawsuits alleging that companies
such as Uber, Grubhub and Handy are incorrectly classifying their workers as independent
contractors.”).
113. See generally Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016) (discussing meaning of employment in the technology sector).
114. See infra sections IV.A–IV.C (examining how federal courts have addressed question of
employment status in technology sector).
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evaluating how the courts have approached this question. Ultimately, this
Essay seeks to navigate these cases, providing guidance on the
information that must be pled to survive dismissal of an employment
claim in the technology sector.
After reviewing the cases in this area, this Essay concludes that the
federal district courts tend to address dismissal motions in platform-based
employment cases in one of three different ways. This is a broad
generalization, but one that is helpful in understanding how the courts
have approached this new and complex question.
Thus, by examining the courts’ recent decisions in gig sector
employment disputes at the motion to dismiss stage, this Essay concludes
that the courts have responded: (1) by finding the case to include
insufficient facts and thus granting dismissal; (2) by concluding that the
complaint contains sufficient factual allegations and thus allowing the
matter to proceed; or (3) by sidestepping the question at this early stage
of the analysis. This Essay first examines cases where the courts have
found the complaint to contain insufficient facts to properly allege an
employment relationship.115 This Essay then examines claims where the
courts have concluded that workers have properly plead employment
within the platform economy.116 Finally, this Essay examines cases in
which courts have simply avoided the issue of sufficient technology
sector pleading.117
The most high-profile decisions in this area have arisen in the
ridesharing context. To be sure, there have been numerous gig sector cases
in other areas of the on-demand economy, but decisions involving Uber
and Lyft have attracted the most headlines.118 To simplify the discussion
in this area, this Essay will look primarily at how the courts have
approached this particular subset of technology sector cases, given that
those cases have driven the law in this area.119 Nonetheless, this Essay
115. See infra section IV.A.
116. See infra section IV.B.
117. See infra section IV.C.
118. See generally Judge Approves $27 Million Settlement in Lyft Driver Lawsuit, CNBC (Mar.
17, 2017, 7:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/judge-approves-27-million-driversettlement-in-lyft-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/4KM8-898K]; Tracey Lien, California Lawsuits
Accuse Uber and Lyft of Discriminating Against Wheelchair Users, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-lyft-wheelchair-20180315-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6RWL-QUHZ].
119. Many of these claims arise in California, which applies analysis from S.G. Borello & Sons,
Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989). The “‘most significant’ consideration”
when examining the existence of an employment relationship is the company’s “right to control work
details.” Id. at 404. The test examines: (1) whether the individual performing work is engaged in a
distinct occupation; (2) whether the work is done with or without supervision; (3) the skill required;
(4) who provides the instrumentalities, tools, and place of work; (5) the amount of time the work is
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seeks to be broad in scope, and to examine the more general question of
the type of elements necessary to successfully plead any workplace case
in the platform-based sector—regardless of the exact nature of the
technology employer involved.
A.

Insufficient Pleadings

The courts, generally, have been reluctant to dismiss platform-based
cases early in the proceedings. Where the courts have rejected these claims,
they have looked to contradictory statements, overly generalized allegations
and insufficient factual detail in the complaint to explain the dismissal.
For example, in Carter v. Rasier-CA, LLC120 the District Court for the
Northern District of California granted ridesharing company Uber’s
motion to dismiss with leave to amend in a case involving a driver because
the court found that the plaintiff had not pled sufficient factual detail to
support his employment status.121 The court rejected the complaint,
holding that it was “insufficient, even at the motion to dismiss stage.” In
dismissing the complaint, the court emphasized the lack of factual support
in the pleadings:
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “employed Plaintiff as an
employee,” . . . but offers minimal factual allegations to support
this conclusion. He states that Uber sets the fare model and
collects fares from users and . . . direct[s] drivers where to
drive . . . . Plaintiff further alleges that Uber may terminate
drivers or require them to take additional training if their “rating”
falls below a certain level . . . . The Court finds this is insufficient,
even at the motion to dismiss stage.122
The court focused in on the question of control, holding that conclusory
statements were insufficient to establish this element of employment.123
The court further required “more factual detail” from the plaintiff to show
how control was actually evidenced by the employer to establish a
plausible claim.124 The court thus required that any amended complaint

performed; (6) the method of payment; (7) whether the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer; and (8) whether the parties believe they are creating an employment relationship. “[T]he
individual factors cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their
weight depends often on particular combinations.” Id. at 404.
120. No. 17-cv-00003-HSG, 2017 WL 4098858, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2017).
121. Id.
122. Id. at *2.
123. Id. at *5.
124. Id. at *2.
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“clearly set forth each legal claim and the facts supporting such claims,
including each defendant’s specific conduct, if he can do so truthfully.”125
In Alatraqchi v. Uber Technologies, Inc.126 the District Court for the
Northern District of California similarly granted the defendant’s dismissal
motion (with leave to amend) because of the plaintiff’s failure to
sufficiently plead his employment status.127 The court specifically found
that the Uber driver in the case had not “adequately allege[d] an
employment relationship with [the company].”128 The court similarly
concluded that the facts did not support this relationship129 and that the
plaintiff’s statements were inconsistent on this issue.130
The court emphasized the plaintiff’s “inconsistent allegations”—for
instance, that he was both an employee and also engaged in a “business
relationship” with Uber.131 The court also raised concerns about the
worker’s “several references to his ‘business arrangement,’ ‘business
relationship,’ and/or ‘partnership’ with [the company].”132 The court did
125. Id. at *5. The court further stated, “Plaintiff’s allegations that Plaintiff is an employee and
Defendant can control when and how drivers earn fares by sending User ride requests is a legal
conclusion that the Court need not accept as true. Although a rating system may be evidence of
Defendant’s control over Plaintiff’s day-to-day work, plaintiff must allege more factual detail about
how this rating system regulates drivers’ activities to make the existence of an employment
relationship plausible and not merely possible.” Id. at *2.
126. No. C-13-03156 JSC, 2013 WL 4517756 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013).
127. Id. at *5.
128. Id. at *4.
129. The pro se complaint appears inconsistent in places with respect to allegations of employment
with Uber. Indeed, the complaint references the plaintiff’s “‘business relationship,’ and/or
‘partnership’ with Uber.” Id. at *5 (“‘Plaintiff entered into the business arrangement with the
Defendant believing this would be along [sic] term, mutually beneficial deal . . . I no longer have the
job that I was working before starting with Uber, and declined several other offers believing that Uber
was serious about a long term business relationship . . . I say again that I was used by Uber during the
most busy night of the year while under the impression that this would be an ongoing business
relationship . . . I was invited to become an Uber partner at the busiest time of the year . . . . I accepted
this Uber partnership . . . I lost money believing that I had enough security in my future income
through this partnership to make the investment in this new vehicle . . . I drove as a partner
of Uber . . . .’”).
130. “Further, in recounting an interaction with a ‘customer’ who inquired as to why Plaintiff went
to ‘work with Uber,’ Plaintiff alleges that he told the customer that “no I[sic] independent with myself,
different company.” Plaintiff also states in his Complaint that ‘I am not an employee of Uber,’
although it is not clear if Plaintiff is referring to his status during his relationship with Uber, or simply
after Uber ended the relationship. At the same time, Plaintiff alleges that he ‘accept[ed] Uber’s offer
of employment,’ and that ‘Plaintiff has not received payment for all of the work performed during the
period of employment.’ Given Plaintiff’s inconsistent allegations, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
motion to dismiss with leave to amend so that Plaintiff may clearly—and concisely—allege the nature
of his relationship with Uber.” Id. at *5.
131. Id. at *5, *89 (internal quotations omitted).
132. Alatraqchi, 2013 WL 4517756, at *5; see also Uber Driving Partner—A Great Part Time Opportunity,
UBER (2019), https://get.uber.com/p/part-time-driving-partner/ [https://perma.cc/SN7Y-MR7V].
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grant leave to amend, but noted that at the present time it could not “supply
essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.”133
These cases demonstrate the approach of certain courts on the issue of
what must be pleaded to establish an employment relationship in the
technology sector. As seen here, these courts have tended to require a high
level of specificity in pleading these facts, rejecting conclusory (or
conflicting) allegations. Indeed, as these cases illustrate, technology cases
will not be allowed to proceed where the allegations fail to include
detailed facts about the working relationship between employer and
employee. And, by rigidly adhering to the Iqbal requirements, these courts
have rejected generalized statements about whether an employment
relationship has been established. Failure to sufficiently plead these facts,
or to make consistent statements throughout the complaint, will result in
dismissal of the claim.
The early caselaw has thus suggested that platform-based pleadings
should be consistent, specific, and detailed to survive dismissal. Plaintiffs
bringing claims in the technology sector should make sure to satisfy this
standard if they want to move their cases into discovery.
B.

Sufficient Pleadings

Unlike the courts in Carter and Alatraqchi, several other courts have
denied motions to dismiss in platform pleading cases.134 A close
examination of these cases—where the courts have allowed the matters to
proceed—will help to better illustrate the pleading requirements in this
area. Generally speaking, these federal courts have applied a much more
relaxed pleading standard from Iqbal and Twombly, forgoing the more
rigid standard used by many other courts.135
For example, in Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,136 the district court for
the Northern District of California found that the Uber drivers in the case
had “alleged sufficient facts to claim plausibly that an employment
relationship exist[ed].”137 In reaching that result, the court noted that the
allegations were sufficient to show that Uber sets the price of rides,
controls driver routes, controls customer contact data, and maintains the

133. Alatraqchi, 2013 WL 4517756, at *4 (internal quotations omitted).
134. See, e.g., Phillips v. Uber Techs., Inc., 16 Civ. 295 (DAB), 2017 WL 2782036, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
June 14, 2017) (finding it “premature at this point to make a finding based [on] the limited record
before it,” but stating allegations “insufficient alone legally to establish control indicative of an
employment relationship”).
135. See supra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court plausibility pleading standard).
136. 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
137. Id.
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power to fine drivers.138 The company further employs workers with no
specialized skills on a frequent basis.139 The complaint also established
that Uber controls the appearance of drivers, as well as the overall
atmosphere experienced by the worker.140 In analyzing the case, the court
fully considered the factors weighing both in favor of and against the
creation of an employment relationship in the matter.141
The court also looked to prior decisions on the employee/independent
contractor issue involving Uber and Lyft.142 Considering the allegations
and prior caselaw, the court held that even if there are facts “that disprove
plaintiffs’ allegations or that tilt the scales toward a finding that Uber
drivers are independent contractors[,] . . . plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts that an employment relationship may plausibly exist.”143

138. “In support of this assertion, plaintiffs have alleged that Uber sets fare prices without driver
input and that drivers may not negotiate fares. If a driver takes a circuitous route, Uber may modify
the charges to the customer. Uber retains control over customer contact information.” Id. at 782
(citations omitted) (citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 39, 40, 42, Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (No. 3:15cv-4670-SI)).
139. “Uber’s business model depends upon having a large pool of non-professional drivers. There
are no apparent specialized skills needed to drive for Uber. Uber retains the right to terminate drivers
at will.” Id. (citations omitted) (citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 25, 36–38, 53–66, 43, Doe, 184 F.
Supp. 3d 774 (No. 3:15-cv-4670-SI)).
140. “Uber also controls various aspects of the manner and means by which drivers may offer rides
through the Uber App. Among these, plaintiffs have alleged that Uber requires drivers to accept all
ride requests when logged into the App or face potential discipline . . . . Uber requires drivers to: dress
professionally; send the customer who has ordered a ride a text message when the driver is 1–2
minutes away from the pickup location; keep their radios either off or on ‘soft jazz or NPR’; open the
door for the customer; and pick up the customer on the correct side of the street where the customer
is standing.” Id. (citations omitted) (citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 44, 45, Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d
774 (No. 3:15-cv-4670-SI)).
141. “Certain factors, as alleged, support Uber’s assertion that drivers are independent contractors,
though not enough to convert the question into a matter of law. These include that the drivers generally
do not receive a salary but are paid by the ride and that the drivers supply their own cars and car
insurance. Even these factors, however, are not necessarily dispositive. It matters not whether Uber’s
licensing agreements label drivers as independent contractors, if their conduct suggests otherwise. Id.
at 782–83 (first citing S.G. Borello and Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399 (Cal.
1989); then citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 40, 50–51, Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (No. 3:15-cv-4670SI); then citing Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 154 Cal. App. 4th at 1, 5 (2007)
(“finding drivers for FedEx to be employees even where drivers supplied their own trucks and
maintained their own car insurance”); then citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 47–48, Doe, 184 F. Supp.
3d 774 (No. 3:15-cv-4670-SI) (“[A]lleging that in certain cities Uber drivers may receive a guaranteed
minimum rate, ‘tantamount to a salary,’ and that in January 2016 Uber announced that drivers will
have
guaranteed
earnings,
thereby—in
plaintiffs’
view—giving
‘Uber
drivers
everywhere . . . essentially guaranteed salaries . . . .’”); then citing Estrada, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 10–
11; and then citing Motion to Dismiss at 6–7, Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (No. 15-cv-04670 SI)).
142. Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 783.
143. Id.
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In a similar case, the District Court for the District of Columbia held
that an assault victim of an Uber driver sufficiently alleged the worker’s
employment status with the business when “a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Uber exercised control over [him] in a manner evincing an
employer-employee relationship.”144 The court examined each element of
the District of Columbia’s five-factor test. In reaching its result, the court
thus looked to a multi-factor control test that is utilized in the
jurisdiction.145 The court here—just like in Doe—found the allegations
sufficient to show that the defendant exerts control over fares, wages, and
other terms of employment.146 And, like in Doe, the court also held that
the allegation of these elements in the case was sufficient to survive
dismissal.147 The court further noted that the company here controlled the
day-to-day operation of workers,148 thus further creating a factual dispute
in the case as to employment status.149
In yet another jurisdiction to address the issue, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found an Uber driver’s complaint
sufficient to establish an employment relationship because it articulated

144. Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2015).
145. Id. at 231–32.
146. “Uber screens new drivers, dictates the fares they may charge, and pays such drivers weekly.
[Plaintiff] claims that ‘[u]pon threat of termination, Uber subjects its drivers to a host of specific
requirements,’ including, inter alia, the use of the Uber app, standards for the cleanliness and
mechanical functioning of their cars, rules regarding tipping, minimum timeframes and acceptance
rates for ride requests, and display of the Uber logo. According to Plaintiff, these facts establish the
first four factors of the aforementioned test. Search maintains that the fifth factor, whether Deresse’s
work is part of Uber’s regular business, is satisfied by his allegation that ‘Uber is a car service’ for
which Deresse was a driver.” See id. at 232 (first citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 7–12, 15, Search,
128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (No. 1:15-cv-00257); then citing Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 12–13,
Search, 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (No. 1:15-cv-00257 (JEB)); and then citing Amended Complaint at ¶ 6,
Search, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (No. 1:15-cv-00257)).
147. “The Court agrees, for the most part. The Amended Complaint sets forth facts illustrating
Uber’s involvement in the selection process of new drivers (by way of its screening procedures);
payment of wages (by paying drivers weekly rather than permitting them to collect payment or tips
directly from passengers); and termination of employees (by enjoying broad latitude to terminate
employees who fail to comply with the company’s standards). As to the question whether driving is
Uber’s regular business, Defendant simply disagrees with Plaintiff’s factual allegation that the
company is a ‘car service.’ It does not argue—for good reason—that even if Uber is a car service, as
alleged, Deresse’s driving is not its regular work.” Id. at 232.
148. “Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Uber controls the rate of refusal of ride requests, the timeliness
of the drivers’ responses to requests, the display on vehicles of its logo, the frequency with which
drivers may contact passengers, the drivers’ interactions with passengers (including how they accept
tips and collect fares), and the quality of drivers via its rating system.” Id. at 233 (citing Amended
Complaint at ¶¶ 15, 8, Search, 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (No. 1:15-cv-00257)).
149. “Taking these allegations as true, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Uber exercised
control over Deresse in a manner evincing an employer-employee relationship . . . in sum, the Court
cannot determine as a matter of law that [the driver] was an independent contractor.” Id.
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“several well-pleaded allegations.”150 The court in this case again looked
to the critical element of control, stating that the defendants:
“control the number of fares each driver receives,” “have
authority to suspend or terminate a driver’s access to the App,”
“are not permitted to ask for gratuity,” and “are subject to
suspension or termination if they receive an unfavorable customer
rating.” . . . [I]n order to serve as Drivers, “drivers must undergo
[] training, testing, examination, a criminal background check and
driving history check.”151
The court also noted that there was factual support to demonstrate that
Uber drivers are financially dependent on the company.152
The court therefore outlined the specific facts plaintiffs had alleged
which supported employment status under federal law.153 And, the court
emphasized the drivers’ assertion that they were “dependent upon the
business to which they render service,” looking to prior case law.154 Thus,
the court concluded that, pursuant to federal law and prior precedent, the
plaintiffs had sufficiently pled their employment status.155
In sum, the federal courts have favored technology sector complaints
brought in the employment context that have included detailed factual
allegations supporting an employment relationship with the company. The
courts have tended to allow these cases to proceed where the facts and
allegations presented are more than generalizations. Where permitted to
proceed, technology sector employment cases also avoid inconsistent
allegations. And, the courts that have been willing to entertain these cases
have taken a more liberal approach to the pleading standards than those
courts discussed in the prior section.156
Overall, then, the federal courts have accepted complaints in the
technology sector that factually support allegations of an employment
150. Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2016 WL 5874822, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016).
151. Id.
152. “Plaintiffs also specifically allege that they are ‘dependent upon the business to which they
render service.’” Id. at *4 (citing Complaint at ¶ 157, Razak, No. 16-573, 2016 WL 5874822 (No.
2:16-CV-00573) (“Plaintiffs and Class members are financially dependent on the fare provided to
them by Defendants.”); then citing Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1383 (3d
Cir. 1985)); see also Razak, 2016 WL 7241795, at *5.
153. Razak, 2016 WL 7241795, at *1–5.
154. Razak, 2016 WL 5874822, at *4.
155. Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 16-573, 2017 WL 4052417, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13,
2017) (“Plaintiff’s allegations that they were Online the Uber App for more than 40 hours in a given
week was sufficient—at the pleading stage—to state a claim for overtime pay under the FLSA.”
(citing Razak, 2016 WL 7241795, at *6)).
156. See supra section IV.A (discussing court decisions granting motion to dismiss on the question
of the existence of an employment relationship in the technology sector).
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relationship, avoid contradictory statements, and provide more than legal
and factual generalizations.
C.

Avoiding the Plausibility Standard

A third approach worth noting—of those courts that have addressed
employment questions arising in the technology sector—has been for
those courts to simply avoid the plausibility issue altogether. These courts
have tended either to conclude that the question of the sufficiency of the
allegations is pre-mature, or to find that the case should be permitted to
proceed without further analysis. Some courts, then, have simply avoided
applying the plausibility standard completely, showing that clear guidance
in this area is badly needed.
For example, in Bekele v. Lyft157 the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts concluded that the Lyft drivers bringing the allegations
were employees when considering the company’s motions to compel and
dismiss.158 The court stated that while Lyft “classifies its drivers in
Massachusetts as independent contractors,” “the complaint alleges”
differently and the “Court will assume that [the plaintiff] is an employee
for purposes of this motion.”159 The court looked further to prior precedent
to find an employment relationship with the company, noting other ridesharing cases which had allowed the complaints to survive dismissal.160
The court thus simply sidestepped the issue by deferring to the analysis
and results of other courts in this area.
Similarly, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts also noted
the “litigated position of Uber” in considering the sufficiency of an
employment complaint brought against the company.161 The court pointed
to cases in California, New York, and Pennsylvania to support this
result.162 The court concluded that “[b]ased on the litigated position of
Uber, then, plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim.”163
157. 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 303 (D. Mass. 2016).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 303 n.18. Some courts have rejected summary judgment in ride-sharing cases on the
question of the existence of an employment relationship; see generally Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp.
3d 1067, 1081–82 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D.
Cal. 2015).
161. Malden Transp., Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 3d 264, 281 (D. Mass. 2017).
162. Id. Many courts have not been persuaded by Uber’s claim that it lacks the control necessary
over its drivers necessary to create an employment relationship. See generally Mumin v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 507, 532 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2016 WL
5874822, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016); O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.
163. Malden Transp., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 281.
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The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma also
sidestepped the question of the existence of an employment relationship
for workers at Uber.164 The court stated that it “does not address this
dispute because even assuming defendant is John Doe’s employer, for the
reasons set forth below, plaintiff has still failed to assert a cause of action
that survives defendant’s motion to dismiss.”165 Like the other cases
discussed here, this federal court also avoided squarely addressing the
worker misclassification issue.
In a similar state court decision, a superior court of Massachusetts
concluded that a ride-sharing driver had sufficiently alleged an
employment relationship under the Massachusetts Wage Act.166 The court
stated that “in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], the complaint
[did] not fail to state a claim.”167 The court did note that, under
Massachusetts law, “it is [Uber’s] burden to prove that [plaintiff] meets
all three prongs of the independent contractor test; it is not [plaintiff’s]
burden to plead that he does not.”168
In sum, a third approach used by the courts when analyzing whether
technology sector workers have been misclassified has been to sidestep
the issue altogether. This is not a surprising approach, given the complex
allegations often involved as well as the confusion surrounding the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions, and the plausibility standard itself.169
Several courts have thus decided not to address the issue at all. As detailed
below, this Essay sets forth a proposed pleading standard for technology
sector employment cases. By creating more certainty in the type of
allegations and facts that would typically be expected in a technology
sector employment case, this Essay provides more clarity in this area.
With a greater level of certainty, the courts may be more willing to address
these issues directly when they arise. Nonetheless, currently, many courts
are simply choosing to avoid wading into the issue at all. The popularity
of this approach illustrates the need for clear guidance in this area.

164. Mazaheri v. Doe, No. CIV-14-225-M, 2014 WL 2155049, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Okla. May
22, 2014).
165. Id.
166. Lavitman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. SUCV201204490, 2015 WL 728187, at *5–6 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2015).
167. Id. at *6.
168. Id.
169. See supra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court’s plausibility standard).
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IV. DRAFTING THE COMPLAINT: A PROPOSED
PLEADING STANDARD
After surveying the recent complaints and caselaw in this area, it is now
appropriate to provide suggestions for drafting a complaint which
plausibly pleads an employment relationship with a technology sector
business. Given the confusion noted above—and even the willingness of
some courts to completely avoid the issue altogether—a model pleading
standard is needed to assist the courts and parties in analyzing this issue.170
A successful pleading model should closely consider the existing
caselaw where plaintiffs have been successful in establishing an
employment relationship with a technology sector business. Looking to
the Carter and Alatraqchi cases discussed above,171 we learn that
technology sector workers must carefully articulate their factual
allegations of employment status. Plaintiffs should avoid any reference to
a “partnership,” or “business relationship,” or “independent worker”
status. Instead, plaintiffs should identify themselves as “workers” or
preferably as “employees.” And, plaintiffs must do more than simply
allege conclusory terms, and should include specific facts supporting their
employment status with the company.
There can be no magic “template” to establish a satisfactory
hypothetical complaint in this or any other area, but there are a number of
general guideposts to use to enhance the likelihood of success of a
particular claim in this sector. This Essay proposes a basic framework to
help evaluate employment claims brought in the technology sector.
The test set forth here is not meant to be exhaustive. Indeed, it is more
of a descriptive summary of the factors the federal courts have already
relied upon before letting a particular platform-type case proceed. Thus,
the framework suggested below must be considered flexible, and each
case must be evaluated on its own merits.
Plaintiffs should thus strongly consider pleading the following
elements of the proposed model:172
(1) when individual works;
(2) where individual works;
(3) how often work occurs;
(4) manner of work performed;
170. Cf. Hirsch & Seiner, supra note 32, at 1782 (“Thus, unions and other groups concerned with
working conditions must seek alternative strategies. Nowhere is this need more pronounced than in
the technology sector, where workers’ employment status remains in flux.”).
171. See supra section IV.A (discussing cases in which the federal district courts have allowed
technology-based employment cases to proceed past the dismissal stage).
172. This model is based on the factors of the test for establishing the employment relationship
suggested in Means & Seiner, supra note 113.
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(5) pricing/cost information; and
(6) any other factors related to control.
Adequately pleading these six factors should sufficiently articulate an
employment relationship that is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
To the extent any details can be provided for each of these factors, they
should be set out in the complaint itself. While the pleadings need not be
lengthy, they should be sufficient to overcome the plausibility standard of
Twombly and Iqbal.173 It is important to note that no single factor will be
dispositive in this test. Nor is any factor necessarily weighed more heavily
than another. Rather, the court will look to the totality of these factors to
determine whether an employment relationship exists. This test aims for
simplicity, as well as effectiveness in practice. An outline more fully
developing each of these factors is discussed below as well as an excellent
example of a complaint in this area.
A.

When Work Performed

The plaintiff should allege any facts supporting when the work was
performed. The exact timing of the performance of one’s job goes directly
to the factors discussed by the Supreme Court in Darden.174 When the
performance of work occurs can greatly impact the nature of the job.
When one’s work is performed also raises the question of the level of
control in the employment relationship.175 Independent contractors tend to
set their own hours whereas employees work when required by the
business. The platform economy has put this question into flux, however,
as employers may encourage workers to perform their tasks during certain
peak periods, though they may not necessarily require the work to be
performed during this time.176

173. See supra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court plausibility standard).
174. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (discussing agency
principles and setting forth elements of the control test).
175. See id. at 323 (including “the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to
work” as elements suggesting control).
176. See Maya Kosoff, Stop Complaining About Uber’s Surge Pricing, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 1,
2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-surge-pricing-on-new-years-eve-2015-10
[https://perma.cc/QG4R-7CMN] (“Surge pricing happens when there’s a high demand for Uber
vehicles in a particular area. During times of high demand—on weekend nights, on holidays, or during
bad weather—Uber enacts surge pricing, which charges a multiplier on every fare during busy times.
Uber says that by raising its prices, it encourages its supply—drivers—to get out on the road to keep
up with increased demand.”).

17 - Seiner.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]
B.

12/20/2019 10:55 AM

PLATFORM PLEADING

1975

Where Work Performed

Plaintiffs should also allege any facts related to where the work was
performed. The exact location where one performs the job can
substantially impact the nature of the work. Whether one performs their
work primarily in an office building, in a car, or in a customer’s home, the
exact location of where the work duties are performed will go directly to
the question of control.177 Where an employer has more oversight over a
worker, and exercises more supervision over day-to-day activities, the
more likely it is that an employment relationship will be created.178
Supervision can occur in many ways, however, and a supervisor need not
physically oversee a worker to exercise control over a
particular relationship.179
C.

How Often Work Occurs

Plaintiffs should further assert in the complaint how often the work
occurs. This is a critical inquiry in the technology sector. Many workers
in the platform economy will use the particular job as a way to supplement
their primary income from another source. It is thus important to allege
whether the employment is part time in nature or whether it should be
considered more of a full-time job. Where a worker spends fifty to sixty
hours a week working for a particular employer, that employer will have
far more control over that particular relationship. And such an employee
would be far more likely to satisfy the control test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Darden.180
D.

Manner of Work

The plaintiff should further set forth clearly in the complaint the
manner in which work is being performed in the technology sector. This
177. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (including “the location of the work” as a consideration in
the control test).
178. See generally id.
179. Cf. Carlson, supra note 8, at 340–41 (“One might measure control, as the courts always have,
by looking to an employer’s direct supervision over and express instructions to the worker in the
performance of his work . . . . But does it follow that the absence of supervision and express
instructions should indicate independent contractor status? A lack of direct supervision . . . might be
due to [other factors such as] . . . the employer’s trust in the worker, earned by many years of
experience and good work.”).
180. See id. at 299, 340–41 (including “how long” an individual works as a consideration of
control). As paragraphs twenty-eight and thirty-two in the model Bradshaw complaint set forth in
Appendix A (and discussed infra) show, the plaintiff in that case expressly stated that Mr. Bradshaw
worked between thirty and sixty hours per week for the ridesharing company. See infra app. A.
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is critical as this emerging industry presents many opportunities for
employment that have never before existed.181 Some federal courts may
be unfamiliar with certain jobs that exist in the platform economy, and a
concise and accurate description of the type of work being performed is
critical for the complaint. The manner of the work performed goes
specifically to the control question as well.182 How the job is done,
including the specific requirements imposed by the company,
demonstrates how much supervision is involved in the worker’s day-today activities.
E.

Pricing/Cost Information

The pricing model is an often forgotten—yet critical—aspect of the
employment relationship. How the pricing is set reveals much about
whether a worker is seen as an employee. Independent contractors set their
own pricing (and often their own hours). Employees, however, rely on the
business to establish what rate customers will pay.183 Again, these are
general guidelines developed over time. A house contractor will typically
provide a quote to a customer based on their own experience and skill set,
whereas an employee at McDonald’s will allow the business to establish
the prices paid for particular menu items. These examples are obviously
at the extremes, however, and again the platform economy creates some
uncertainty in this area.184 Nonetheless, pricing is an important factor to
examine and often reveals where the true control exists in the working
relationship between the business and individual performing the job.
F.

Any Other Factors Related to Control

As clearly discussed throughout this Essay, the platform-based
economy is new, still emerging, and evolving in many ways. The industry
itself places a high value on new ideas and different ways to reach
customers and potential clients. It is impossible to fashion a test here that
would be directly applicable to every company in the technology industry,

181. See generally Seiner, Tailoring Class Actions, supra note 11 (discussing the importance of the
manner in which work is being performed in determining the existence of an employment relationship
in technology sector cases).
182. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (discussing control factors for employment).
183. Means & Seiner, supra note 113 (discussing the importance of pricing models in evaluating
employment status in the on-demand economy).
184. See Heather Somerville, True Price of an Uber Ride in Question as Investors Assess Firm’s Value, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/newswires/news/business/true-price-uber-ridequestion-investors-assess-firm-article-1.3435439 [https://perma.cc/8JFB-4NLZ] (“The new [Uber pricing]
system also uses an algorithm to better price rides to minimize losses.”).
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as well as one that would capture future businesses in this area. Indeed,
there can be little doubt that the sector will look far different in five years
from how it appears today. Thus, the factors set forth here are important
guidelines for establishing where control lies in the working
relationship,185 but the proposed model does not purport to be an allinclusive test. It is therefore important to have some type of catch-all
provision that would allow plaintiffs to assert certain other facts specific
to their employment relationship that are suggestive of control.186 These
factors could represent any information that would further help a court to
determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.
Perhaps more importantly, this final factor is a reminder to plaintiffs to
take a step back and look more holistically at the facts of the case to
determine if there are any other elements that should be alleged. In the
face of Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs must look beyond conclusory
allegations to more broadly represent early on the nature of the
employment relationship and any supporting facts.187 Thus, as no test is
all inclusive, plaintiffs should consider alleging other facts and should be
encouraged to assert any information in the case which suggests that the
employer has more control in the working relationship.
In summary, plaintiffs should plead as many supporting facts as
possible in a technology sector complaint. They should outline facts
specific to their working experience which help support the business’s
control over the working relationship. They should be as concise as
possible, avoiding any “contradictory” statements in establishing
the claim.188

185. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 339 (“What is it, then, that distinguishes employer control over
employees from employer control over independent contractors? The answer of the courts has been
that an employer controls the details of an employee’s work, but only the results of a contractors
work.”).
186. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (discussing agency principles and control factors
for employment).
187. See supra Part III (discussing the plausibility test developed in Supreme Court caselaw).
Beyond establishing the elements of the employment test, however, plaintiffs should make sure to
satisfy the other requirements of the claim. They should thus make sure to provide facts supporting
the argument that a violation of an employment statute has occurred—whether under federal or state
law. This analysis is well beyond the scope of this Essay, which is limited to the question of analyzing
the existence of an employment relationship in the technology sector—not whether a violation of the
law itself has occurred.
188. See supra section IV.B (discussing lower courts’ dissatisfaction with contradictory statements
in technology sector complaints).
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The Bradshaw Complaint—An Illustrative example

The model proposed here may be a bit abstract, and it can be helpful to
examine an actual technology sector pleading that implicates a worker’s
employment status. In Bradshaw v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,189 the
ridesharing company did not argue that the plaintiffs had insufficiently
pled their employment relationship with the business.190 The federal
district court noted that:
[i]n the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants do not
take issue with Plaintiff’s pleading sufficient facts to establish that
they were his employer for purposes of [federal wage/hour law].
Defendants contend, however, that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient
facts to support his contention that he was paid less than the statutory
minimum wage or that he was entitled to overtime pay.191
The detailed nature of this complaint helped the worker in this case to
establish an employment relationship with Uber. Thus, the Bradshaw
complaint includes highly detailed factual allegations that are set forth in
Appendix A. This detailed complaint alleges general facts supporting the
workers’ employment status and specific facts setting forth the plaintiff’s
individual experience with Uber.192
Technology sector workers should examine the Bradshaw complaint
when drafting their own pleadings in a similar case. The ideal allegations
would plead not only general facts concerning the business’s relationship
with workers, but it should further state facts supporting the individual’s
relationship with the company. Additionally, the ideal complaint would
frame these facts in the context of the proposed framework set forth in this
Essay, using the elements set forth as a guide to including all of the
relevant facts. While the Bradshaw complaint does not perfectly model
the approach suggested here, it is nonetheless an excellent example of the
type of detailed pleadings sufficient to allege an employment relationship
in the technology sector. While not perfect, then, the attached complaint
is currently the best attempt by a plaintiff to demonstrate that such a
working relationship exists in a platform-based business. It thus provides
a nice template—combined with the proposed framework set forth here—
for technology sector workers to consider when preparing a complaint in
this area.
189. No. CIV-16-388-R, 2017 WL 2455151, at *8 (W.D. Okla. June 6, 2017).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. For the purpose of brevity, this section does not include all of the facts alleged in the Bradshaw
complaint. Rather, this detailed complaint is attached in Appendix A. Infra app. A. Again, while the
Bradshaw complaint does not identically mirror the factors set forth in the proposed framework, it is
one of the closest examples of such an ideal pleading for platform based employment.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED STANDARD

This Essay has examined many of the current cases in the federal courts
analyzing who is an employee in technology-based cases. Synthesizing
this case law, this Essay proposes an analytical framework for pleading
these technology sector claims. As noted throughout this Essay, this
approach is not intended to be exhaustive and should serve merely as a
guideline for approaching these types of claims. As with any framework,
there are a number of benefits and drawbacks to analyzing cases under a
more fixed approach. It is worth highlighting some of those implications
here, but it is also important to note that this test should never be applied
in an overly rigid way. Indeed, the test itself specifically incorporates
flexibility into the factors enumerated.193 And, as seen in the Bradshaw
complaint attached here, there may be many ways to successfully plead a
case outside of (or in conjunction with) the proposed model.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of the framework proposed here is the
ability it provides the courts to better understand whether there are any
shortfalls in a particular claim. As demonstrated in the cases above, the
courts have taken highly varied approaches with respect to analyzing these
types of technology sector cases. The courts have been openly frustrated
with the lack of guidance they have been given in this area, struggling to
fit the square peg of the evolving modern economy into the round hole of
existing—and outdated—caselaw and legislation.194 The approach
suggested here gives the courts a template from which to work and to
examine the types of factors necessary to establish an employment
relationship in a platform based claim. The courts can thus compare the
facts of the case before them against the framework proposed here in
determining whether a complaint is sufficient to proceed. The approach
proposed here specifically incorporates and navigates the Supreme Court
plausibility caselaw, and further considers the recent platform-based
decisions of the federal district courts. Thus, this framework provides an
updated examination of the pleading requirements necessary for litigants
to be permitted to proceed in the technology field. The courts, while
understandably confused when considering these claims, will now have
better guidance when undertaking this endeavor.
Similarly, this test assists both defendants and plaintiffs to better
understand, evaluate and frame litigation in this area. Plaintiffs will have
193. See supra Part V (noting importance of taking holistic approach to pleading elements of
control in technology sector workplace case).
194. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (determining who is an
employee in the technology sector is like being “handed a square peg and asked to choose between
two round holes”).
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a template to use to help explore what facts to highlight in their claims.
The test proposed here thus allows plaintiffs to work from a framework in
setting forth the necessary elements for creating an employment
relationship in the technology sector. Previously, plaintiffs were left with
the general guidance provided in the Supreme Court’s Darden decision of
control and its many possible elements.195 This framework has simply not
been updated to reflect the evolving modern economy. The test proposed here
attempts to do just that, incorporating the reality of platform-based work with
the traditional test for control and common law agency principles.196
In the same way, defendants can determine if there are any shortfalls in
the case, and the proposed factors quickly establish what arguments can
be made with respect to the lack of any employment relationship.
Defendants can thus use the framework to quickly determine whether the
workers involved in a platform-based claim are employees or independent
contractors. Where an employment relationship does not appear to have
been created, defendants can move to dismiss the claim.
The test proposed here would also bring greater certainty to this area of
the law.197 Given the confusion which currently exists, some general
guidelines are long overdue. Through more certainty in this area, the
likelihood that technology-based cases will settle is greatly enhanced.198
This has the additional benefit of reducing the amount of litigation in the area,
benefiting both parties as well as the judiciary. More certainty and more
settled law in a particular field inherently leads to greater settlement
numbers.199 Reduced litigation financially benefits all parties and allows the
courts to focus more closely on those claims where true legal disputes exist.
Working from a common framework, this model also allows plaintiffs
to better streamline their allegations. Rather than throwing everything at
a complaint to see what sticks, plaintiffs will have a standard model to
help better focus their claims. More streamlined, straightforward
195. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (discussing agency
principles and control factors for employment).
196. See supra Part V (discussing the Darden control factors in the context of technology
sector workers).
197. Where there is greater certainty in the law, there can be additional comfort given to potential
startups in the technology industry. The uncertainty surrounding state and federal employment laws
can undoubtedly act as a barrier for many aspiring technology businesses. Where the rules are more
clearly established, potential businesses will be much better able to assess the potential risk, and
benefits, of incorporating.
198. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, Commonality and the Constitution: A Framework for Federal and
State Court Class Actions, 91 IND. L.J. 455, 490 (2016) (addressing the benefits of certainty in the
legal system); Stewart, supra note 34, at 662 (“The more certain the law—the less variance in
expected outcomes—the more likely the parties will predict the same outcome from litigation, and
the less likely litigation will occur because of differences in predicted outcomes.”).
199. See Seiner, supra note 198, at 490; Stewart, supra note 34, at 662.
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complaints will allow cases to move forward much more quickly and
more readily provide notice to defendants of the allegations against them.
And, through this analytical framework, plaintiffs will much more easily
be able to identify and assert the factors necessary to establish the
existence of an employment relationship.
Though the model suggested here would lead to many efficiencies for
plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts, there are nonetheless certain
drawbacks. Perhaps the greatest concern raised by the use of this test
would be that the courts would apply it too rigidly. As seen in the federal
court decisions issued shortly after the creation of the plausibility standard
in Twombly, many of the federal courts—particularly in the civil rights
context—used the new standard to heighten the pleading bar and dismiss
otherwise legitimate claims.200 With any test, then, the possibility exists
for the courts to use a given standard as a reason to dismiss a particular
claim. Some courts may thus consider the proposed standard to create a
heightened bar, and not apply it with the flexibility that was intended.
Though the concern certainly exists that the courts would apply the
proposed framework too rigidly, the same courts would likely find other
reasons to dismiss the case even in the absence of the standard
suggested here.
Similarly, given the evolving modern economy, there can be no onesize-fits-all approach. It is entirely possible that many claims will arise
where this model is simply insufficient or does not work for the particular
case. It is impossible to envision all of the platform-based cases that can
arise, or how technology companies may evolve in the future.201 The
courts and litigants must be careful, then, to consider this test simply as a
broad guideline. It is not a standard of proof, and there are likely to be
situations where the elements do not fit the facts of the particular case.
Additionally, caution should be used when attempting to apply the factors
proposed here to the more traditional brick-and-mortar type employment
relationships. While the factors would still be relevant in those types of
situations, the test proposed here was created with technology sector
claims specifically in mind.
Finally, given the number of factors proposed above, there is also a
danger that plaintiffs will attempt to over-plead their claims. Alleging all
of the factors could enhance the pure size of many complaints, which

200. See supra Part III (discussing rigid application of the Supreme Court’s plausibility standard
in the employment and civil rights contexts).
201. See, e.g., Forbes Tech. Council, Upcoming Technology, Ten Trends to Watch in the Next Five
Years, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2016/12/27/upco
ming-technology-10-trends-to-watch-in-the-next-five-years/#210c260e2fd1
[https://perma.cc/G6Q4-WQW5] (examining changes that may occur in the gig sector). Similarly, it
is impossible to predict what technology-based jobs will even look like in the future.
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would lead to some long-winded claims that would be difficult for the
courts to assess. Given the number of elements proposed above, it is
therefore fair to have some level of concern that the proposed test will
lead to lengthy complaints that are too large and cumbersome. While this
is certainly a possibility that should be acknowledged, by analyzing more
precise elements targeted specifically at the exact question at issue,
plaintiffs are more likely to focus in on the relevant factors of a case.
While there is no way to completely prevent inartful pleading, in practice,
litigants will be able to use the elements of the proposed framework to
prepare a more streamlined, concise complaint that identifies the critical
areas at issue.
No test is perfect. And any proposed standard certainly comes with
some risk. At the end of the day, however, given the level of frustration
and confusion in this area, some guidance is undoubtedly necessary for
pleading platform-based claims. This guidance should be applied in a
flexible manner, and the test proposed above attempts to capture the many
different factual scenarios that could exist in a technology-based case. The
test is specifically targeted at identifying whether a worker is an
employee, and it attempts to weed out those claims where only
independent contractors are involved.202 The test proposed here provides
definitive judicial efficiencies, should lead to more focused, careful
litigation, and allows the courts to focus on those cases where litigation of
the facts and law is necessary. With almost all litigants currently confused
as to how to properly evaluate a complaint in this area,203 more certainty
in this field of the law is needed. The framework proposed here provides
that certainty. This Essay also seeks to foster further debate on the topic,
as well as additional discussion of the requirements necessary for
technology
sector
workers
to
sufficiently
allege
an
employment relationship.

202. It is worth emphasizing that the analytical framework proposed here only attempts to answer
the question of whether there is sufficient evidence in a technology sector case to create the existence
of an employment relationship. The model was not intended to apply to the more traditional brickand-mortar employment relationships. Similarly, the test does not attempt to address the more
complex question of whether there is an actual violation of a state or federal employment law. Rather,
the proposed-framework only seeks to answer the more basic question of whether the worker in the
platform based case satisfies the definition of being an employee. See generally, Joseph A. Seiner,
Understanding the Unrest of France’s Younger Workers: The Price of American Ambivalence, 38
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1053, 1077–78 (2006) (discussing the requirements to bring an employment
discrimination claim).
203. See supra Part IV (discussing different approaches of litigants and the courts to analyzing the
employment issue in the technology sector).
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CONCLUSION
As this Essay demonstrates, there is widespread confusion and
conflicting federal court opinions on the question of worker classification
in the technology sector. The courts have always struggled with defining
the employment relationship, and the new platform-based jobs in the
modern economy have only complicated this inquiry. As this Essay
shows, the federal courts have issued varied opinions on the issue of
worker classification in the platform economy. The need for guidance in
this area has never been greater, and this Essay attempts to provide some
fundamental ground rules for litigating in this field. No model is perfect,
and no framework can capture every factual scenario in this evolving
industry. The guidance proposed here, however, provides some clarity to
an otherwise confused area of the law. The law must adapt and evolve
with the changing economy, and new rules are needed to define
employment outside of the traditional brick-and-mortar working
relationship. Looking to the realities of technology sector work, this
Essay—for the first time—attempts to provide this new definition.
Hopefully, this Essay will spark a dialogue as to how employment should
be characterized in this new economy and how we can help better secure
the federal and state workplace protections that are now at risk for many
workers in this emerging industry.
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Appendix A:
Selected Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint in Bradshaw v. Uber
Technologies204
2. Uber, a company valued at more than $50 billion, has and
continues to take unfair advantage of its financially struggling
Uber Drivers by terming them “Independent Transportation
Providers.”205 Only in the counterfactual world could Uber
Drivers be considered “independent.”206 Uber Drivers lack
discretion in the performance of their employment relationship
with Uber, and have no independence apart from Uber in
performing their employment with Uber.207
3. Uber Drivers are able to secure fares only through Uber’s
mobile application, which governs every aspect of Uber Drivers’
transportation services for Uber.208 When Uber restricts a Driver’s
access to Uber’s mobile application, Uber effectively terminates
the Driver, as the Driver is unable to work for Uber or Uber’s
users. Uber’s misclassification of its Drivers as non-employees of
the company has resulted in Uber Drivers’ inability to earn
minimum wage.209
4. Plaintiff alleges that he and other Uber Drivers are employees,
and as employees, are entitled to basic wage protections such as
expense reimbursement, overtime pay, rest- and meal-breaks, and
other benefits that attach to employees that do not likewise attach
to independent contractors.210 Uber misclassifies its drivers as
independent contractors to evade these and other protections of
Oklahoma law as well as the Fair Labor Standards Act.211
5. Moreover, Uber intentionally misrepresents to the public how
it compensates its Drivers so that it can retain a disproportionate

204. Complaint, Bradshaw v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CIV-16-388-R, 2017 WL 2455151 (W.D.
Okla. June 6, 2017).
205. Id. at 1.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
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percentage of the fares generated by Uber Drivers.212 Uber
markets its rides as gratuity-included, but Uber does not remit the
gratuity (or an amount in-kind) to Uber Drivers.213 Uber
effectively takes the tips.214 To worsen the reality for these
Drivers, Plaintiff and members of the putative class finance all
expenses related to their employment with Uber (e.g., gas, cost of
insurance,
deductibles,
and
vehicle
maintenance,
among others).215
18. Defendants employ(ed) Plaintiff and members of the Class,
exercised control over their wages, their hours, and their
working conditions.216
19. Defendants regulate every aspect of Uber Drivers’
job performance.217
20. As with other employers, Defendants required Plaintiff and
Uber Drivers to submit to background checks, and to disclose
banking information and residence, as well as social
security numbers.218
21. Uber requires Plaintiff and Uber Drivers to register their cars
with Uber and the vehicles cannot be more than ten years old.219
22. Uber Drivers do not pay Defendants to use Defendants’
intellectual property, the mobile application. Uber Drivers do not,
in the strictest sense, pay Uber a fee as consideration for use of
Uber’s mobile application.220
23. Rather, Defendants compensate their Uber Drivers based
upon the employment arrangement that Uber unilaterally imposes
upon its Drivers, as with any employment-based
business model.221

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2–3.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 6.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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24. Uber Drivers are not engaged in a business distinct from
Uber’s business.222 The Uber application ensures this.223 Through
the application, Uber controls and directly manages Uber’s entire
transportation service, critically, inclusive of its Drivers.224
25. Plaintiff’s and Uber Drivers’ ability to earn income depends
solely on Uber and not in any way on an Uber Driver’s particular
skill or acumen, or on any managerial or other discretionary job
skill.225
After these general allegations about Uber drivers, the Bradshaw
plaintiff included specific facts about his personal work relationship
with Uber:
26. Plaintiff is a retired Oklahoma State Trooper.226
27. In February of 2014, Plaintiff began working for UberX. He
is still currently employed as an Uber Driver.227
28. On average, Plaintiff drives thirty (30) hours each week and
Uber compensates him on a weekly basis.228
29. In 2015, Plaintiff drove 40,000 miles.229 He grossed
$23,872.00, but after paying his employment related expenses,
which using the federal rate of 57.5¢ per mile, were $23,000,
Plaintiff netted only $872.00 for the year, even though he worked
1,500 hours that year.230 In other words, he made just 58 cents per
hour.231 In addition, the $23,000 for expenses did not include car
washes, which cost him $300 per year, as well as satellite radio,
which cost him $200 per year.23231. When Plaintiff first started,
after Uber retained its portion of the fare but before paying his
employment related expenses, Plaintiff earned between $500 and

222. Id. at 7.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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$600 per week.233 Plaintiff’s expenses, including gas, insurance,
lease payments, and car repairs, were approximately 30% of any
amount earned ($150 to $180 each week).234
32. For some time during his employment, Mr. Bradshaw worked
in excess of 50 to 60 hours a week.235 At all times, Uber failed to
pay overtime compensation.236
33. The terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment have
changed drastically since he first was hired by Uber.237 The
changes were instituted by Uber, without any input from Plaintiff
or other drivers.238
34. Initially, Plaintiff and other drivers earned $1.50 per mile.239
Now, he and other Uber Drivers earn only .70¢ per mile.240
Throughout his employment, Plaintiff has been subject to several
price reductions implemented at the sole discretion of Uber.241

233. Id. at 7–8.
234. Id. at 8.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.

